This paper is oriented to study the relationship between demographical factors and international capital flows. We analyse the impact of ageing on foreign direct investments (FDI) and foreign portfolio investments (FPI) on a bilateral level. Firstly we present a theoretical foundation of the relationship and then we test it by an empirical model. Theoretical foundations are based on the lifecycle hypothesis and overlapping generations model in a demographic context. The bilateral FDI and FPI are modelled by using fixed effects balanced panel data. The results suggest that the current and future age structure of the nation has significant effect on current international capital flows.
Introduction
Past decades have shown clear trends of the population ageing in the OECD countries. This is the result of the combination of two main developments in these countries: a decrease in the fertility rate and an increase in life expectancy. The immigration flows do not compensate for this decrease in the labour endowments. As a result the OECD countries will face the problems of insufficient labour force and increasing costs of financing the retirement pensions. This is expected to have an important impact on the level of future returns on capital, prices of financial assets and international capital movements.
However, the demographic transition processes or age structure evolution have different timings across different regions in the world 1 . Many non-OECD countries will face an important positive labour force growth while the OECD countries will be confronted with a negative labour force growth. This implies different age structure and dependency ratios across the globe 2 .
Hence, to the extent that capital is internationally mobile, the important differences in current and future dependency ratios implied by these different ageing patterns are supposed to have a positive effect on the flows of capital from developed countries (relatively more aged countries) to emerging countries (relatively less aged countries).
So far the studies testing an impact of demographical factors on international capital flows focus on a very aggregate level (e.g. they use data on current account, capital outflows -defined by the net value of gross domestic savings minus domestic investments).
However, as noticed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2000) , among others, different types of capital flows have different properties with regard to features such as risk, liquidity, tradability, reversibility, expropriability and tax treatment. Only under perfect information and with no distortions, can we consider the capital structure as irrelevant (according to the Modigliani-Miller Theorem) . Since demographic factors can have different impacts on different types of international capital flows the aggregation of the capital flows can lead to overestimation of the coefficients.
In this paper we analyse the impact of ageing in different types of capital flows, namely on foreign direct investments (FDI) and foreign portfolio investments (FPI) 3 , on a bilateral level.
Firstly we present a theoretical foundation of the relationship and then we test it by empirical model.
Theoretical foundations are based on the Lifecycle Hypothesis and Overlapping Generations (OLG)
model in a demographic context. The bilateral FDI and FPI are modeled by using fixed effects balanced panel data.
The results suggest that the current and future age structure of the nation has significant effect on current international capital flows. Moreover, we found evidence that demographic factors have different impacts on FPI and FDI.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we enlighten some stylised facts. In section 3, we give a very brief overview of the theoretical background and empirical works done in this field. In section 4, we build up an empirical model to test the linkages. In section 5, we describe the data and variables we use for econometric modelling. In section 6, we report the econometric results. In section 7 we conclude and point out several directions for future research.
Stylised facts
The world economy is currently confronted with two important trends, one concerns the recent evolution in international capital flows, and their role in the developing process of the emerging economies, and the other one concerns the current and future evolution in demographical patterns.
On the investment side, capital flows to developing countries have increased in recent years, mostly taking the form of FDI. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2 . Figure 1 shows that for the period of 1980 to 2008 the FDI net inflows to different developing countries has substantially increased. Figure 2 shows that the FDI net inflows as a percentage of GDP, for the same period and group of countries, also point up an upward trend. If we look now to the Foreign Portfolio Equity Investments to developing countries, a somewhat different pattern is perceptible. Figure 3 illustrates that outline also for the period of 1980 to 2008. We can see that the Portfolio Equity net inflows to developing countries remained relatively unchanged in the 80´s, increased modestly in the 90´s for most of the observed countries and record a sharp increase in the first half of the last decade to end up with a big crash in the most recent years due to the current financial crisis 4 . On the demographic side the trend concerns the difference in ageing patterns between industrialized and developing countries. Industrialized countries are ageing significantly faster than other countries mostly due to the ageing of the baby boom generation and the declining birth rates. In sharp contrast, the developing countries have a much younger population. This is illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 where we can observe the old age dependency ratios 5 for a selection of industrialized and emerging countries from 1950 to 2050. 4 The turning point is 2006, when market rumors that the US economy was slowing down, lead to a big crash in the emerging economies stock markets. 5 The ratios are presented as number of population aged 65+ per 100 persons of working age (15-65). In the Figures we can observe that the old age dependency ratio forecast for 2050 is substantially higher for the developed countries than for the developing countries. As an example we can highlight the case of Japan, Germany Spain and Portugal, industrialized economies that are expected to have a three times higher old age dependency ratio than Angola, South Africa, Egypt or India. Even within the two groups of countries there are significant different age patterns between countries. In the group of developed countries, we can observe in Figure 4 that Japan is expected to have more that the double of old age dependents than the United States. Similarly, in the group of developing countries, we can see in Figure 5 , that Russia is expected to have by 2050 a four times higher old dependency ratio than Angola.
The important differences in current and future dependency ratios implied by these different ageing patterns are supposed to have a positive effect on the flows of capital to emerging markets through three different channels. Firstly, the ageing of populations in industrial countries could lead to an increase in savings of working people in the short to medium term. Secondly, differences in demographics are likely to reinforce the differentials in the expected rates of return to capital between industrial and developing countries. Thirdly, the ageing of populations in industrial countries is leading to pressures for pension reform. These reforms, some of them already in course in most of the OECD countries, are likely to result in greater responsiveness on the part of pension funds to investment opportunities in developing countries. And even within developed countries we can expect capital flows from relatively more aged countries to relatively less aged countries, since the age patterns within OECD countries also record significant differences, as stressed out before.
Theoretical background and earlier empirical works
The first group of studies in this field relies on the Life Cycle Theory of consumption and savings by
Modigliani, which makes use of the dependency hypothesis 6 (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954 and Ando and Modigliani 1963) .
6 Formulated by Coale and Hoover (1958) .
The lifecycle hypothesis states that individuals tend to smooth their consumption over time. Individuals accumulate assets during their working years and consume these assets during their retirement years (Bommier and Lee 2000) . According to the hypothesis, individuals tend to consume different kinds of assets at different moments in their lifetime. In the beginning of their active life, they tend to invest in housing and progressively in more risky assets. As they grow old and have fewer working years ahead of them, they tend to invest in less risky assets as they cannot rely anymore on an income in the next period of their life (the retirement period). In other words, in earlier periods of their working life, they are willing to bear more risk because they rely on their income. In the last period of life, people's income is smaller thus becoming more averse towards risky assets. Thus people seem to shift from preference for risky assets to preferences for less risky assets. This hypothesis is also occasionally called the Lifecycle Risk Aversion Hypothesis, which establishes the rationale for agents with constant risk aversion to substitute from equity to bonds as they age, assuming that most investors' labour income are poorly correlated with stock returns.
Several empirical studies confirm the relationship between savings and age predicted by the life cycle theory (Mason 1988 and Collins 1991, among others) .
However, these studies do not take into account the capital demand side and only under perfect capital mobility is this justified. Otherwise domestic savings and investment are jointly determined and cannot be analysed separately. Higgins (1998) is one of the authors that clearly state the necessity of taking into account the capital mobility when analyzing demographic effects because incomplete capital mobility can hamper demographically induced capital flows. As many studies have shown, capital is mostly not mobile (e.g., see French and Poterba 1991 , Frankel 1992 , Obstfeld 1995 , Kang and Stulz 1997 and Portes and Rey 1999 .
The most recent studies in the field rely on the Overlapping Generations (OLG) model, that derives follows directly from the life cycle hypothesis, which is its essence. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) developed the first computable general equilibrium model of dynamic life-cycle economies. The simplest OLG model captures the fact that a population includes people with different ages and different planning horizons and that these individuals at different stages of their lifecycles interact in markets. It enables us therefore to aggregate the behaviours of individuals at different stages of their lifecycle (described previously according to the lifecycle hypothesis) within a closed or open entity and to analyse the effects of interactions between groups of individuals. Higgins and Williamson (1996) were able to show that investment is clearly linked to the labour force growth that needs to be equipped with capital. They also showed that savings rates are high for a large work force and decline gradually as the economy grows older. The authors concluded that we can expect a current account deficit in "young" economies because of their investment demand and their low level of national savings. The deficit then turns into a surplus as the economy becomes more aged.
7 Higgins (1998) found empirical evidence for savings, investment and net capital flows' patterns predicted in their simulation model. However, it can be problematic to interpret some of these results.
Namely current account includes transactions in goods, services, and interest payments, between countries. The most suitable way to analyse investment behaviour would be focusing on transactions reflected by capital account.
Moreover, the present demographic patterns are not the only factor affecting current capital flows.
Lührmann ( Brooks (2003) developed an OLG model with rational, forward-looking agents and found evidence that age distribution has significant effects on financial markets and that although agents are forwardlooking, the transition from Baby-Boom to Baby-Burst will lead to a sharp decline in asset returns.
More recently, Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2006) used a stylised multi-country overlapping generations model and long-term demographic projections for different sets of countries to project international capital flows over a seventy-year period and they found evidence that population ageing results, at least in an initial stage, in a higher capital stock, but when the Baby Boom generations start to consume their retirement savings the capital stock is expected to decrease. Their simulations suggest that significant effects of capital mobility will occur, even if capital flows are restricted to the OECD (capital flows from fast ageing countries to less fast ageing countries). They also conclude that saving rates, rates of return and international capital flows react substantially less to demographic change once households absorb some part of the demographic shock by lengthening the working period in their lives.
According to these models, individuals who save during their working lives to finance their consumption during retirement generate the capital stock in a country. Therefore a high population share of people in their thirties and forties is likely to generate a strong tendency towards capital outflows, while countries with higher youth dependency rates tend to be net importers.
All the authors mentioned so far focus mainly on the changes in the direction and volume of the The aggregation can therefore lead to wrong conclusions. In the following sections we try to compensate for this lack in the literature. We analyse the impact of ageing on foreign direct investments (FDI) and foreign portfolio investments (FPI) on a bilateral level.
The reasons for foreign portfolio investment flows were discussed above. To the best of our knowledge no literature has been issued concerning the direct relationships between ageing and FDIs. However there are certainly some linkages to be considered, which we can identify using traditional theories for explaining FDI flows. First of all the reason for investing into foreign countries could be the total output and market size of the destination country. The market seeking investors would go to the markets where there is a lower percentage of retired people. Moreover, if the destination country faces a higher youth dependency rate, the workers are expected to have lower savings rates and higher consumption rates. This could result in an investment gap and consumption deficit, which both encourage foreign investments into this country.
The additional reason to move from "aged" economies to "young" economies can be derived from the life cycle theory (Vernon 1966) . First of all when the overall population size does not change and there are more retired people in an economy, who normally in average consume less, then the maturity stage of product life cycle will come earlier. Therefore the producers who want to compensate for R&D and product introduction costs will search for a lower-cost production destination and/or the markets with higher consumption. Especially it will be true for durable goods production.
Finally, if there is an oligopolistic competition then the oligopolistic reaction theory of Knickerbocker (1973) would predict even higher flows to the "younger" economies. Mainly because of two reasons:
following the leader or "threatening" other firms on their home or main markets.
So we can expect the increase of FDI to "younger" economies from the side of market-seeking or/and efficiency-seeking foreign investors.
In what follows we develop an empirical specification in order to establish the link between demographic patters and FDI and FPI flows.
Empirical Strategy
In this section we develop an empirical specification in order to study the impact of ageing on foreign direct investments (FDI) and foreign portfolio investments (FPI) on a bilateral level. The bilateral FDI and FPI are modelled by using fixed effects balanced panel data.
We analyse a panel dataset with 8 capital source countries 9 and 38 capital host countries 10 (see 
Data and variables
As dependent variables we use FDI end-of-the-year positions by partner country and FPI end-of-theyear positions by partner country. FDI data comes from OECD (International Direct Investment Statistics) and are presented in millions of US dollars. FPI data comes from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Data (CPIS), which is released by the International Monetary Fund, and accounts for Total Portfolio Investments (equities, short-term and long-term debt securities).
In order to capture features of the economy of the origin and destination country that can induce capital flows we use the following control variables (data sources in parenthesis) 11 :
(1) GDPOC and GDPDC (World Development Indicators -WDI) -gross domestic product in the capital origin country and capital destination country, respectively. These variables are used to measure the level of development of the economy that determines the level of savings that the economy can generate. In addition, these variables determine the level of human capital, the level of economic development and the development of financial markets (Market Potential). We expect both variables to have a positive effect on international capital flows.
(2) MARKCAPDC (WDI) -market capitalization level of the capital destination country as a proxy for the market share of private business in a country. In addition this indicator presents the proxy for the level of development of the financial market. A positive sign is expected since the more developed the financial market of a country is, the more capital inflows are expected to occur.
(3) GKFDC (WDI) -gross capital formation on destination country. A negative sign is expected. As the gross capital formation in the destination country increases foreign capital inflows are expected to diminish (assuming that the investment gap diminishes with the increase in Gross capital formation) (4) FREEDC (Freedom House) -a variable to capture national political stability on the destination country -political rights and civil liberties as a proxy of political stability. The justification for the use of such variables is that political instability is connected with economic and financial instability and in that sense might influence the investor's decision. It is expected that the higher the political stability of a country, the higher the capital inflows to the destination country. A negative sign is expected 12 .
(5) EFREEDC (Heritage Foundation) -a variable to capture economic freedom and prosperity in the destination country. If a government exerts coercion above a certain level in the market place, economic growth might suffer and that is expected to diminish the capital inflows to the host country.
A positive sign is expected 13 .
Demographic factors are then measured by the following demographical variables 14 :
(1) DEPODC 15 (WDI) -current old age dependency ratio of the destination country. Assuming that old-age is associated with pure dissaving, an increase in the share of the elderly should induce negative capital flows from the capital origin country to the capital destination country ("old" economies tend towards running current account deficits). Therefore a negative sign is expected for the coefficient of this variable.
(2) DEPYDC 16 (WDI) -current youth age dependency ratio of the destination country. Higgins and Williamson (1996) found that we can expect a current account deficit in "young" economies because of their investment demand and their low level of national savings. Therefore countries with relatively 12 Political Rights and Civil Liberties are measured on a 1-7 scale, with 1 representing the highest degree of Freedom and 7 the lowest. The Grading Scale used is: "F," "PF," and "NF" respectively stand for "free," "partly free," and "not free". Until 2003, countries whose combined average ratings for Political Rights and for Civil Liberties fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designated "Free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 "Partly Free," and between 5.5 and 7.0 "Not Free." Beginning with the ratings for 2003, countries whose combined average ratings fall between 3.0 and 5.0 are "Partly Free," and those between 5.5 and 7.0 are "Not Free." 13 To measure economic freedom and rate each country, the authors of the Index measure ten components of economic freedom, assigning a grade to each using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum freedom. The ten component scores are then averaged to give an overall economic freedom score for each country. The ten components of economic freedom are: Business Freedom , Trade Freedom, Fiscal Freedom, Government Spending, Monetary Freedom, Investment Freedom, Financial Freedom, Property rights, Freedom from Corruption, Labor Freedom. 14 All ratios are presented as number of dependants per 100 people in working age (15-65). 15 Old age dependency ratio is defined as ratio of the population 65+ to the working-age population between ages 15 and 65. 16 Youth age dependency ratio is defined as ratio of the population between 0-14 to the working-age population between ages 15 and 65.
high youth dependency rates have a propensity to be capital importers. We expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
Empirical results
This section presents the results of the empirical specification developed in section 4. We report results for FDI and FPI end-of-the-year positions of a origin country i in a destination country j. As follows we discuss the results for the two dependent variables. The panel data analysis gives us results, which are in accordance with our expectations. As table 1 shows, the general performance of the model is satisfactory for both regressions. The explanatory power of the regression with FPI as dependent variable is to some extent bigger than the one with FDI dependent variable ( =0.459 and =0.329 respectively).
Regarding the control variables, used in order to capture features of the economy of the origin and destination countries that can induce capital flows, three are statistically significant in both regressions (GDPOC, GDPDC, GKFDC).
GDPOC and GDPDC, used as measurements of economic size, present a positive sign for both regressions and this goes according to our expectations. In recent years several studies applied the methods from traditional gravity models to bilateral international investments 19 and found that the market size of source and destination counties have a positive effect on cross-border capital flows.
20
Gross capital formation on destination country (GKFDC) exerts a very small, but statistically significant, negative influence on both dependent variables. That goes according to our expectations for the reasons offered in section 5.
The other three variables used as control variables (MARKAPDC, FREEDC and EFREEDC) are not statistically significant for both regressions with and as dependent variables.
To study the impact of the current age structure of a country on bilateral international capital flows we use two variables, namely the DEPOOC and DEPYDC. Both variables are highly significant at a 1% level for both regressions. This confirms that the present age structure influences cross-border capital flows The DEPOOC variable is the old dependency ratio in the capital origin country. The coefficient presents a negative sign for both FDI and FPI regressions confirming our prediction that an increase in the share of the elderly (associated with dissaving) is linked with a tendency towards capital inflows to the source country (repatriation of capital). The most obvious difference between the two regressions lies on the magnitude: the coefficient of the variable DEPOOC is more than the double for FPI than it is for FDI.
19 Studies on FDI include Wei (2000) and Stein and Daude (2007) and studies on portfolio equity flows include the one of Portes and Rey (2005) . 20 Also the distance between countries (among others) influence capital flows but since we use a fixed effects specification in our analysis time-invariant variables are included in as explained in section 3.
The variable DEPYDC, which accounts for the youth dependency ratio for the destination country, has a positive effect both on FPI and FDI, as we predicted. That can be explained because "young"
economies have a high investment demand while generating few savings domestically, and that tends to draw the economy into a current account deficit. That implies an increase in the capital flows from the source to the host country. We want to stress that the differences in magnitude of the demographic effect on explaining FDI and FPI flows are again considerable. In this case the magnitude is five times higher for the FPI regression than it is for the FDI regression. The observed differences in magnitude can probably be explained with the fact that FPI usually have more liquidity and tradability than FDI. Moreover the former is usually more driven by present factors than the latter, which is usually a somewhat longer term investment and cannot be redirected each period.
To test the possibility that international capital flows can be related to the expectations about the future demographic trends we use two additional demographic variables, namely the DEPOF20OC and DEPYF20DC. At this juncture, the distinctions between the two regressions are even more significant.
The variable DEPOF20OC presents a positive sign confirming our expectations. It is significant at the 5% level for the regression with FDI as dependent variable and significant at the 10% for the second regression, with FPI as dependent variable. The magnitudes are also different for both regressions (to some extent bigger for the FPI than for FDI). If forward-looking agents in the origin country expect an increase in the share in the elderly in 20 years time they are likely to increase private savings today and that can lead to an increase in the current capital flows from relatively more aged countries to relatively less aged countries 22 .
The variable DEPYF20DC is only statistically significant for the regression with FDI as dependent variable (at a 5% level) presenting the expected positive sign. For the regression with FPI as dependent variable it is not statistically relevant and the sign is not according to our expectations. Once more the divergence in the results can be explained by the different properties of the capital flows. As aforesaid FDI are usually long term capital flows while FPI are usually short and medium term capital flows.
Moreover FPI 23 are relatively less forward looking than FDI.
These results confirm our hypothesis that future age structure of the nation has significant effect on current international capital flows and reinforce the confirmation of our suspicious that demographic factors have different impacts on FPI and FDI and therefore deserve a separate study.
Conclusion
This paper develops an empirical framework in order to study the impact of ageing on international capital flows. The Life Cycle Theory, Overlapping Generation's (OLG) model, and some recent empirical works suggest that ageing of populations can lead to an increase in savings of working population. At the same time increase in the share of elderly people and youth can decrease the savings of the economy and the capital demand because of lower level of labor force. As a result differences in demographics are likely to reinforce the differentials in the expected rates of return to capital between industrial (faster ageing) countries and developing (slowly ageing) countries in the future. But the current age structure of a nation should not be the only factor to be taken into account. The expectations about the future age structure of the nation can force forward-looking agents to change their investment behavior in favor of relatively younger countries. This might lead to higher capital export from developed countries to emerging economies already today.
To test these relationships we use fixed effects balanced panel data with bilateral FDI and FPI positions as dependent variables.
23 Portfolio Investments are usually connected with the expression "hot money" in the financial press. The results, presented in section 6, suggest that the current and future age structure of the nations has significant effect on current international capital flows. Moreover, we found evidence that demographic factors have different impacts on FPI and FDI.
There are several directions for future research. One important issue is the role of the precedent bilateral FDI and FPI flows to explain present bilateral capital flows. If we find that the existence of previous cross-border capital flows influence present and future capital flows a dynamic panel data model, with lagged dependent variables, might be preferable to the fixed effects balanced panel data used in our study.
A problem that might arise with the use of lagged dependent variables is the significant correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error term in the scenario of a short time dimension and a larger country dimension (the state of this paper analysis). However even if no longer-time-series data become available in the future, for bilateral FDI and bilateral FPI, using the Arellano -Bond Dynamic Panel GMM Estimators might solve the correlation issues.
Another interesting topic would be to learn if the recent financial crisis increases the differentials in the expected rates of return of capital between faster ageing countries and slowly ageing countries. We defer that for future research. 
